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I. Introduction
The three major economies in Northeast Asia have not escaped damage from the 
Atlantic-centered fi nancial crisis and Great Recession. Japan has suffered the 
most in terms of employment and economic growth, which is ironic because it 
is less open to trade and investment than either Korea or China. China seems to 
be handling the crisis best, but appearances would be deceiving if nascent asset 
bubbles and the credit boom are not arrested. Korea has navigated the Lehman 
credit panic and is well positioned for a steady, sustainable recovery.
The fi nancial sectors in these three Northeast Asia economies are better posi-
tioned to intermediate savings and extend credit that can foster an economic 
recovery than those in the United States or the European Union (EU). That is 
obvious. But it also is worth noting that this is because banks, regulators, and 
corporations have learned from mistakes made in the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis. 
Stress tests conducted by Moody’s suggest that asset quality will deteriorate 
from the fallout of the global crisis, but only marginally in the central case 
scenario. And even in a worst-case scenario, each system will not be materially 
damaged. Large-scale government intervention will not be necessary. Banking 
sector consolidation on the scale seen in the wake of the 1997 crises in Japan 
and Korea is not in the cards. And in another contrast with 1997, Chinese banks, 
instead of hunkering down, are expanding internationally even as some Western 
banks have been forced to undo their expansion in the world’s fastest-growing 
and soon to be second-largest national economy.
The government’s balance sheet is not a constraint on recovery in 2010 for Japan, 
China and Korea, but it is a risk for Japan over the longer term. However, the 
greatest challenge to sustainable recovery to previous trend growth rates may not 
lie within the three large Northeast Asian economies; instead, it may be external. 
As the United States tightens its belt to live within its fi nanceable means, global 
rebalancing would disrupt the export-led or -dependent economies in the near 
term and dampen their growth over the long term.
II. Macroeconomic Effects and Outlook
The seizure of and panic in the international dollar funding market upon the 15 
September 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers helped transform the U.S. re-
cession into a deep global recession. The global economic outlook progressively 
deteriorated through late 2008 and early 2009 as refl ected in an unprecedented 
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series of downward revisions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 
macroeconomic projections during this time.
The bottoming out of the collapse in the major global economies in the fi rst half 
of 2009 was followed by tepid signs of recovery in the second half and stronger 
signs in early 2010. This sense of recovery is refl ected in the upward revisions 
made by the IMF in its October 2009 World Economic Outlook and in its Janu-
ary 2010 update. The long-term effects of the Great Recession on the potential 
growth rates of the major economies are murky, but it is likely that the growth 
path has been shifted downward. A challenge will be for the United States, the 
EU, and other major economies to restore productivity-driven growth, rather then 
leverage-driven growth, before their demographic pressures present signifi cant 
new challenges to growth and public fi nances. This means a decade from now 
in the United States.
East Asian GDP Growth Takes a Beating but Is Not Knocked Out
The three major Northeast Asian economies have taken a beating as the col-
lapse in demand for their exports spread throughout their economies, with the 
collapse in real GDP growth rates exceeding that which occurred with the 2001 
U.S. recession (Figure 1). The effects are mixed, however, when referenced to 
the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis. The infection this time is milder for Korea but is 
more severe for Japan. China is suffering, but not as much as Japan, if changes 
in pre-2008 growth rates is the reference point used. In early 2008 it appeared 
that all three of these economies would weather the storm fairly well. The most 
urgent challenge then was infl ation driven by the spike in oil and food prices. 
Those who believed in decoupling were not discredited until the post-Lehman 
panic set in in the global credit markets in late 2008.
As the gloom receded during the summer of 2009, forecasts were revised up-
ward. The small, open, and advanced economies of Singapore and Hong Kong 
led the way most dramatically. Sharp rebounds in growth occurred as 2009 
progressed, although these followed almost equally precipitous declines in the 
fi nal quarter of 2008 and fi rst quarter of 2009. The Australian economy skirted 
recession by recording positive, 2.0 percent growth in 2009. This refl ected the 
residual strength in China’s economy, which provides a strong source of external 
demand for Australia’s mining commodities. But it also refl ected the effi cacy 
of exceptional measures taken by the central bank and government to stabilize 
the country’s fi nancial sector.
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Figure 1: GDP Growth in Northeast Asia, 1994–2010
Sources: International Monetary Fund; Moody’s Investor Service.
The Case of Korea
Forecasts originally put Korean real GDP growth at around 4 percent for 2009. 
These were progressively lowered to a nadir of -4 percent for the most part, al-
though pessimistic observers saw growth declining by as much as 5 percent or 
6 percent. “Green shoots” took hold early in Korea, and for the year as a whole 
real GDP eked out a positive 0.2 percent growth rate in 2009. The sharp contrac-
tion in investment and exports has driven down the growth rate. Although the 
dollar value of merchandise exports fell around 13 percent in 2009, the decline 
in volume terms was less severe but was still a drag on GDP growth.
The outlook for 2010 is for the Korean economy to grow 4 to 5 percent. Much 
depends on the strength of the global recovery, yet export growth will likely 
muster high, single-digit positive growth, in part because of the better economic 
conditions in East Asia.
The Case of China
While China achieved its economically and politically sensitive 8 percent real 
GDP growth target in 2009, and then some, growth did sharply decelerate from 
the 13 percent rate of growth in the precrisis year of 2007. The slowdown in 
China’s growth rate from 2007 to 2009 may be only slightly less steep than 
Korea’s, about four percentage points. The government’s budgetary stimulus 
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and use of the state-owned banking system, where total credit to local govern-
ments and to the state-owned enterprises surged an astonishing 32 percent last 
year, has supported domestic demand–driven growth, especially investment in 
infrastructure.
It was the sharp decline in exports that accounted for the drop in the overall 
growth rate in 2009. National account statistics are not well developed in China, 
but Moody’s estimate is that net exports had contributed about three percentage 
points of growth before the crisis, but this year net exports are removing three 
percentage points of growth. Like Korea, the dollar value of China’s exports 
may decline sharply, only a bit steeper by almost 16 percent in 2009.
China’s economic growth will likely pick up in 2010. But the extent to which 
it does will be determined on the upside by global demand for China’s exports, 
and on the downside by the degree to which the authorities wind down the 
economic stimulus program. With overcapacity and price defl ation currently 
prevailing, infl ationary pressures are distant. This supports the authorities’ stance 
of maintaining economic stimulus in 2010.
The Case of Japan
The Japanese economy hit bottom in the fi rst quarter of calendar year 2009. There 
are favorable signs of recovery, but momentum is frail. At midyear corporate 
bankruptcies declined for the fi rst time in a year as the default rate of small- and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) has peaked, apparently.
The recovery, however, is from a very low base to which the economy has sunk. 
Like the United States, Japan is in its deepest recession since the 1940s. Unem-
ployment hit a historical peak of 5.9 percent in August 2009 although it moder-
ated slightly late in 2009. The combined effects of price defl ation and economic 
contraction will produce a fall in GDP of almost 6 percent in calendar 2009, or 
more than 3 percent again in fi scal year 2009 as in FY 2008 (beginning April).
The collapse in merchandise exports, 33 percent in 2009, is more severe in Ja-
pan than in Korea or China, as much of Japan’s exports are durable household 
and investment goods, purchases of which have been sharply curtailed in the 
United States and EU. 
The fall in output is worse than in the United States or in any other large, major 
economy in Europe. Japan’s real economy has not decoupled from that of the 
United States.
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The growth outlook for Japan is more uncertain than for China or Korea. Unem-
ployment will likely remain high as the dynamic part of the country’s economy, 
the export industries, will continue to remain adversely affected by fragile global 
economic conditions (Figure 2). Moreover, the Bank of Japan expects that defl a-
tionary pressures will persist into 2011. This will depress domestic demand.
Figure 2: Rate of Unemployment in Japan and Korea, 1994–2009, 
percentage
Source: International Monetary Fund.
III. The Crisis and Government Finances
If there is one area where the emerging-market Asian economies have decoupled 
from the advanced countries, it is in government fi nances. The fi scal effects of 
the global recession on Korea and China are very much muted compared with 
Japan and, especially, the United States and most EU countries. Figure 3 shows 
the astonishing increase in defi cits and government debt in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Never before in peacetime have government fi nances 
deteriorated so drastically and so abruptly. The collapse in tax revenues, the fi s-
cal stimulus, and fi nancial as well as corporate sector bailouts account for the 
ballooning of government debt.
The accumulation on Japan’s government debt overhang is similar in magnitude 
to that in the United States and the UK. The toll on government fi nances is due 
to the effects of the severe recession alone. Financial sector bailouts have not 
impacted the Japanese government budget or debt, in contrast with the 1997 
and 1998 fi nancial crisis.
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Figure 3: Effects of the Financial Crisis on Advanced-Country Defi cits and 
Debt
Source: International Monetary Fund, Eurostat, and Moody’s estimates.
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Among member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Korea has the largest fi scal stimulus program as a share of GDP, 
yet its effect is not as drastic on increasing government debt. One reason is 
that the recession will be rather mild in Korea in 2009. Korea’s budget defi cit 
widened to only 2.1 percent of GDP in 2009, but it will decline steadily during 
the next several years to a balanced position by 2013 or 2014.
China’s government budget defi cits was only around 3 percent of GDP in 2009 
and probably a similar or slightly lower level in 2010. The rebound in tax rev-
enues removes downside risk to the fi scal outlook. Figure 4 shows the increase 
in government debt estimated for the crisis period, 2008–2010, for selected 
Asian economies. Except for Japan, East Asian debt accumulation is much less 
than seen in some advanced economies.
Figure 4: Effects of the Financial Crisis on East Asian Government Debt, 
as percentage of GDP
Source: Moody’s Investor Service.
As severe as the global recession is on the Korean economy, the fi scal effects 
pale compared with those from the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis. Public sector 
debt spiked to more than 50 percent of GDP from 10 percent of GDP before 
the crisis for a brief period, taking into account IMF, World Bank, and fi nancial 
sector bailouts. However, the lingering effects of the massive fi nancial sector 
rescue have kept government debt relatively elevated at 30 percent of GDP as 
Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and Korea Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation (KDIC) bonds were gradually fi scalized directly onto the central 
government’s balance sheet.
IV. Financial Sector Performance during the Global Crisis
Just as government fi nances in emerging-market Northeast Asia do not pose the 
risks to recovery that are seen in some advanced economies, fi nancial sectors 
are proving resistant and will play a role in, or will not hinder, recovery.
The Case of Korea
Korean banks’ credit fundamentals have come under pressure, but no major 
deterioration is expected—if the global recession has indeed bottomed out and 
a gradual improvement continues (see Table 1). The largest Korean commercial 
banks’ intrinsic bank fi nancial strength ratings (BFSRs) were lowered to C-, a 
notch below the global average rating of C.1 BFSRs of the policy banks—namely, 
Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), National Agricultural Cooperative Federation 
(NACF), and Suhyup Bank—are lower, yet the weighted system average for 
the rated Korean banks is C-. 
Table 1: Korean Bank Ratings
Pre-1997 
crisis
Peak 1997 
crisis Current
FC senior unsecured debt
Average A3 Ba3 A2
Range A1 to Baa3 Ba1 to B1 A2
FC long-term deposit
Average A3 Caa1 A2
Range A1 to Baa3 Caa1 A2 to A3
BFSR
Average D E+ C-
Range C+ to E D to E C- to D-
Source: Moody’s Investor Service 
Note: BFSR = bank fi nancial strength rating; FC = foreign currency.
1 Moody’s BFSRs range from A to E, with A denoting very strong standalone not requiring excep-
tional outside support from shareholders or the government at the top end of the scale, and E denot-
ing very weak fundamentals likely requiring support at some point in the near term. C’ is the global 
average and denotes moderate strength.
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Nonperforming loans (NPLs) have declined to low levels, to 1.5 percent of total 
loans, from double-digit levels after the 1997 crisis, but this indicator is back-
ward looking. Forward-looking stress tests conducted by Moody’s suggest that 
bank capital is adequate under the central scenario, which is aligned with our 
macroeconomic forecast over an 18-month horizon. We also do not see a need 
for capital even under our worst-case scenario. Stress tests seek to replicate the 
worst conditions going back to the 2003 credit card crisis, the 2001 U.S. reces-
sion, or the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis, but they include modifi cations in the 
analysis to take into account the reduction in corporate leverage and improved 
bank governance, for example.
The most vulnerable assets of banks will be credit card exposures and loans to 
the construction and shipping sectors (Table 2). Banks’ loans to SMEs are not 
considered to be as vulnerable. This is an interesting side note as many analysts 
and commentators have fl agged this sector as a potential source of the next fi nan-
cial crisis in Korea. Total expected losses (calculated by probability of default in 
each asset category multiplied by the historical loss-given default) are a rather 
modest 2.5 percent in the base case and a moderate 7.6 percent in the worst case. 
Note that banks’ NPLs are currently lower than 2 percent of banks’ assets.
Table 2: Stress Test Estimated Losses in Korea, September 2009
Type of loss
Base case
(%)
Worse case
(%)
Credit card 6.0 20.0
Construction 5.5 16.0
Shipping 5.5 16.0
Small- and medium-size enterprise (SME) 3.5 9.8
Large corporate 1.5 6.5
Others1 0.4–2.5 1.5–9.6
Moody’s rated banks – average 2.5 7.6
Source: Moody’s Investor Service.
1 Includes residential mortgages, real estate, nonhousing loans, other loans, and credit guaranteed 
SMEs.
The safest sectors are residential mortgages and large corporations, namely the 
chaebol, with residential mortgages much sounder than corporations. This is 
good news for the banks, as household debt rose to 76 percent of GDP and to 
140 percent of disposable income in 2009 (the latter level is similar to that of 
households in the United States); half of household loans were housing-related 
loans (MOSF 2009). The relative soundness of chaebol debt now is in sharp 
             Navigating Turbulence in Northeast Asia: The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance    11
contrast with the exceptional weakness of the chaebol sector in 1997, the collapse 
of which contributed greatly to the intense economic dislocation in subsequent 
years.
Korean banks have, however, developed vulnerability in their lack of liquid-
ity provided by a stable deposit funding. This is refl ected in the high systemic 
loan-to-deposit ratios, which deteriorated as the deposit base stagnated in the 
early 2000s (Figure 5). A major source of funding for Korean banks, around 
10–12 percent in early 2009, was in foreign currency, namely dollars, from off-
shore capital markets. Korean banks were highly exposed to the seizure in the 
international dollar markets from the Lehman panic. Only the relatively high 
level of offi cial foreign exchange reserves in the Bank of Korea (BOK), some 
of which were made available to the banking system; a government guarantee 
of external debt of domestic banks; and an exceptional, $30 billion BOK swap 
arrangement with the U.S. Federal Reserve (which was made available to the 
Singaporean, Mexican, and Brazilian central banks as well) prevented a foreign 
exchange–induced banking crisis. In the Asia-Pacifi c area, Australian banks also 
have relatively high loan-to-deposit ratios, but they funded themselves for the 
long term as the fi nancial crisis unfolded in 2008 and had more readily available 
offshore capital market funding because of their greater intrinsic strength and 
the Aaa qualities of the Australian government.
Figure 5: Disintermediation of Deposits and Intense Market Share Competi-
tion in Korea, 1997–2008, in trillions of Korean won and percentage
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Supervisory Service.
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The Case of China
Chinese banks entered the crisis in relatively good shape domestically, as their 
performance tracked that of the hypercharged performance of the country’s 
economy. In the depths of the global crisis in early 2009, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) emerged as the world’s largest bank as 
measured by market capitalization, deposits, and profi ts. The relative health of 
Chinese banks (compared with their past and with many banks in the advanced 
economies) is also due to government interventions in the late 1990s that hived 
off the large chunk of NPLs in the state-owned banks into several state-owned 
asset management companies.
The policy-induced credit boom set in motion in November 2008 has seen a 32 
percent increase in total lending in 2009 compared with just 12 percent in 2008. 
The astonishing surge in lending raises concerns over asset quality and capital 
adequacy. Although there was no immediate deterioration in banks’ credit fun-
damentals in 2009, NPLs actually declined in absolute terms and relative to total 
loans, their ratings could come under pressure if the surge continues too much 
longer. Banks’ balance sheets have been stretched, with capital adequacy and 
loan-to-deposit ratios approaching regulatory thresholds, although such levels 
are higher than Bank for International Settlements–mandated thresholds. The 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has expressed concerns, but 
the ultimate arbiter of policies is the State Council, which has a near-term policy 
priority of reviving growth and maintaining employment and social stability.
Chinese banks had an adequate amount of capital entering 2009, but by the end 
of last year it was clear that the major banks would need additional capital to 
maintain Tier I levels at a prudent level of 9 (Table 3). In addition, loan loss 
provisions have moved up to 150 percent, a level that the CBRC believed in 
late 2009 would adequately cover future NPLs from the credit surge. NPLs are 
as low as in the Korean system—fewer than 2 percent of loans—while banks 
remain profi table in the economic downturn.
Our expectation is that loan growth will decelerate to 20 percent in 2010, a level 
that would be consistent with 9 percent real GDP growth. An overshooting of 
the economic stimulus strategy, or an undershooting of economic growth, would 
add to concerns over Chinese banks’ asset quality and the soundness of their 
credit fundamentals.
Chinese banks have not hunkered down, but have expanded in the midst of the 
crisis. China Merchant Bank, a joint-stock bank not totally owned by the state,
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Table 3: Northeast Asia Bank Ratings
Country Average BFSR CAR BIS ratio CAR BIS Tier 1 ratio
Korea C’- 13.7 10.3
China D- 12.0 9.6
Japan1 C 10.6 8.3
Source: Moody’s Investor Service. 
Note: For Japan, the ratios are the average of 6 city banks, 4 trust banks, 4 other major banks, and 
108 regional banks.
Note: BFSR = bank fi nancial strength rating; BIS = Bank for International Settlements; CAR = 
capital adequacy ratio.
became the fi rst Chinese bank to reenter the United States in almost two decades. 
This was closely followed by ICBC and China Construction Bank, the largest and 
one of the largest state-owned banks. China had fi rst entered the U.S. banking 
market back in 1982, not long after Sino-U.S. ties were normalized in 1979, but 
activity stopped with passage of the U.S. Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement 
Act of 1991, which tightened regulatory oversight of foreign bank entities.
In contrast, foreign banks’ loan balances declined sharply in 2009. For example, 
Bank of East Asia’s lending fell 6 percent in the fi rst half of the year. Part of the 
reason for the decline in lending was prudential—banks were unwilling to loosen 
credit standards—and part was because foreign banks are at a disadvantage in 
competing for infrastructure fi nance.
The Case of Japan
Of the three Northeast Asian banking systems, Japan’s is the only one on which 
Moody’s is currently retaining a negative outlook. The reasons are largely 
threefold—consistently low profi tability through economic cycles, net inter-
est income is not commensurate with lending and risk taking, and insuffi cient 
capital adequacy.
In FY 2008 (end March 2009) the majority of large Japanese banks experienced 
annual losses for the fi rst time since FY 2004. The major reasons were a sharp 
decrease in fees, a sharp rise in credit expenses, and substantial impairment 
losses from their holdings of equities. The recovery in the equity market since 
mid-2009 and the abatement in corporate bankruptcies in recent months suggest 
that the worst is over.
A limited number of banks hold large amounts of foreign-originated structured 
fi nance securities that have incurred signifi cant losses. Some have kept those 
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securities on their balance sheets, meaning unrealized losses that are putting 
pressure on their capital. Nonetheless, additional losses from those securities will 
not signifi cantly affect Japanese banks’ credit fundamentals or their ratings.
Although Japanese banks can likely weather the storms coming from the other 
side of the globe, loan growth will likely remain anemic. The economy’s relapse 
into defl ation also bodes ill for a pickup in credit demand. Moreover, the pro-
posal by Shizuka Kamei, the new extraordinary minister (minister for fi nancial 
and postal services), to introduce a loan moratorium bill added a large dose of 
regulatory uncertainty which inhibits the fl ow of credit in the economy.
Moody’s does not expect any signifi cant change in the business model of Japa-
nese banks. Large banks’ substantial equity holdings will not change much, and 
weak corporate funding requirements will continue to prevail. The low interest 
rate environment and banks’ low profi tability will not change much. However, 
Japanese banks are not troubled by overleveraged debt problems of the household 
sector, as U.S. and EU banks are. Japanese banks continue to benefi t from a large 
deposit base as the loan-to-deposit ratio is below 90 percent. In the absence of 
the need for a radical transformation of their business model or a substantial 
deleveraging of portfolios, Japanese banks will continue to muddle through.
V. Conclusion
“Commercial credit is the creation of modern times and belongs 
in its highest perfection only to the most enlightened and best 
governed nations. Credit is the vital air of the system of modern 
commerce. It has done more—a thousand times more—to enrich 
nations than all the mines of the world.”
—Daniel Webster
Speech to the U.S. Senate, 18 March 1834
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The three major economies in Northeast Asia have not experienced a fi nancial 
crisis as the United States and the EU are undergoing; neither has there been a 
reprise of 1997 for the Korean and Japanese systems. Rather, their economies 
are being buffeted by the global recession, but their banking systems are prov-
ing to be relatively resilient.
Among the three major Northeast Asian economies, China and Korea are bet-
ter positioned than Japan to navigate a sustainable recovery over the near to 
medium term and probably longer. Neither China nor Korea is burdened with a 
large overhang of government debt, the refi nancing of which diverts credit from 
more productive uses in the private sector and threatens to drive up interest rates, 
should the strong domestic bias of institutional investors and banks shift. That 
could happen should confi dence in government policies sag.
In addition, Korea and China, especially, have banking systems that function 
well—in China’s case extraordinarily well—in intermediating the high amount 
of savings in the system into the businesses and households. In contrast with the 
surge in government-encouraged bank lending in China, Korean bank lending 
slowed sharply in 2009. Government guarantees on SME borrowings as part of 
the Korean fi scal stimulus program may have prevented a contraction. Anemic 
credit growth in Japan relapsed into a contraction in loan growth during the 
darkest months of the global fi nancial crisis and recession last year (Table 4). 
Table 4: Credit Growth to the Private Sector; Korea, China, Japan and 
Selected Pacifi c Rim Countries, 2008 and 2009, in percentage of change
Countries
2008 2009 (Dec. 2008–Sept. 2009)
China 14.0 29.8
Japan 1.1 -2.5
Korea 14.9 3.1
Indonesia 30.7 2.6
Thailand 8.8 0.1
United States 2.3 2.2
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note: Depository corporations claims on the private sector.
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All fi scal stimulus programs by defi nition and by their exceptional nature are 
not sustainable. Therefore, as the stimulus measures are wound down, economic 
growth prospects will become increasingly sensitive to export demand. But this 
will not fi ll the sails of the economy until the world’s largest economies, the 
United States and the EU, heal themselves. Until then China and Korea may fare 
better as domestic demand–driven growth has played a larger role even absent 
fi scal stimulus in those two countries, while in Japan it never really emerged as 
a steady drive of growth in the post-bubble era.
Over the longer term, the ability of both Chinese and Korean corporations to 
invest in new industrial capacity, and of those governments to invest in infra-
structure, will help boost productivity as the ultimate driver of growth. Moreover, 
neither China nor Korea has an imminent demographic problem from a fast-aging 
population that imposes additional fi scal burdens and saps economic dynamism. 
Long-term prospects for China and Korea, therefore, remain more robust than 
those of Japan. Indeed, the Japanese economy may have slipped into third place 
in terms of scale, behind not only the US but also China in 2009.
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